Electoral Folklore: An Empirical Examination of the Abortion Issue by Stempel, Jeffrey W & Morris, William D
Yale Law & Policy Review
Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 1982
ARTICLES
Electoral Folklore: An Empirical Examination
of the Abortion Issue
Jeffrey W. Stempel*
William D. Morris**
For nearly a decade, the abortion issue has loomed large in American
politics. City councilmen, state legislators, congressmen, presidents, and
Supreme Court nominees are routinely asked their opinions on legalized
abortion. Despite the controversy generated by pro-life and pro-choice'
interest groups, little is known regarding the issue's impact upon voting
behavior. This study seeks to enhance that knowledge by empirically
examining congressional general elections in order to assess the impact
of the abortion issue. We then review our finding that the abortion issue
does not alter established voting patterns in these contests.
I. The Abortion Issue.- A Pohtical War Without Casualty Figures
During the past decade, abortion has been perhaps the most emo-
tional and divisive issue in American politics. One national magazine,
in its cover story devoted to the issue, described public division on the
issue in Armageddon-like terms:
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1. Semantics has comprised a major battle of the abortion controversy. Those opposing
the Roe v. Wade, 340 U.S. 113 (1973), decision have termed themselves "pro-life", a designa-
tion frowned upon by those favoring legalized abortion. Not surprisingly, this "pro-choice"
group resents the implication that it opposes life. This study will forego taking a position on
terminology and refer to each faction in the terms that each group itself uses. Those against
legalized abortion will be termed pro-life and those favoring legalized abortion will be termed
pro-choice.
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All across America, abortion is under greater attack than at any time
since the Supreme Court legalized it in 1973. To its opponents, abortion is
murder, and they have engaged in a crusade to wipe it out. Justifying
their actions on moral grounds and backed by the authority and money of
the Roman Catholic Church, they are engaging in civil disobedience remi-
niscent of the antiwar movement and taking their case to legislatures and
the courts. And making considerable headway.
2
That same year, a widely-read columnist observed:
Over the last few years, political analysts have noted the significance of
the single-issue voter: the person who cares only about a candidate's views
on gun control, for example, or busing, or capital punishment. It is clear
now, I think, that one such issue is likely to have the largest impact on
American politics for the longest time. That is abortion.
3
Political science professor Walter Dean Burnham of the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology noted "[The abortion issue] is a single-issue
movement with a difference. People who are against abortion care
about it with the deepest intensity. For religious or other reasons, they
treat it as a non-negotiable issue."
'4
In addition to possessing zero-sum traits, 5 the issue has polarized
American opinion. Forty-one percent of Americans surveyed have
agreed with the statement that "abortion is murder," while 48 percent
disagreed with the statement. 6 The issue remains prominent and divi-
sive today.7 Despite its prominence, the abortion issue is a paradox in
2. Abortion Under Auack, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 1978, at 36.
3. Lewis, A Singular Issue, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1978, at A27, col. 5.
4. Id. at A27, col. 5.
5. A zero-sum issue is one in which the prevailing party gains a total victory while the
losing party achieves none of its policy goals regarding the issue. Many political issues, e.g.,
block grant appropriations to states competing for these funds, are not zero-sum in nature.
For example, New York may not get as much money as it sought becase California received
all it asked; nevertheless, New York gets at least some of what it sought. While, of course,
there exist legal positions between the extremes of unrestricted abortion and completely for-
bidden abortion, these differences are relatively minor. Either abortion is basically legal or it
isn't. Thus, if the pro-choice position prevails, pro-lifers lose.
Professor Burnham's observation, see note 4, supra, would therefore appear to apply to both
pro-life and pro-choice forces. As NEWSWEEK's 1978 cover story observed, "[flor both sides,
the abortion issue is an emotional one that does not lend itself to compromise or cool debate
. . . . Both sides claim they are defending civil rights--opponents the rights of the unborn
child, supporters the rights of the pregnant women." See supra note 2, at 36, 37.
6. See de Boer, The Polls.- Abortion, 41 PUBLIC OPINION Q 554 (1978) (June, 1970 Harris
Poll asks "It has been argued that abortion is murder and no one has the right to take the life
of another under any circumstances. Others say that society takes human life for a number of
reasons. Do you consider abortion murder or not?"); see also NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS
ACTION LEAGUE, SHOULD ABORTION BE LEGAL? MOST AMERICAN VOTERS SAY "YES!":
PUBLIC OPINION POLLS ON ABORTION ISSUES, at 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as NARAL,
Should.Abortion Be Legal?] (1979 ABC News/Harris Survey asks respondents to agree or disa-
gree with the statement "To perform an abortion is the equivalent of murder, because the
fetus's life has been eliminated."; 45 percent agree, 49 percent disagree).
7. See Wright, Human Life Federalism Amendment, (on file with the YALE L. AND P. REV.)
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that pro-choice and pro-life activists do not usually emphasize the issue
to the electorate at large. Rather, both interest groups have sought to
target their communications to those voters thought most receptive.8
Undoubtedly, these targeted efforts have achieved some success in creat-
ing interest group pressure that may be used to lobby incumbent legisla-
tors. Many observers have also credited these interest groups,
particularly the pro-life forces, with substantial electoral impact. 9
Though partisans on both sides claim credit for electoral victories and
defeats, and politicians treat both groups with deference, few studies
have attempted to gauge the impact of the abortion issue in more than
an anecdotal manner. In 1976, NARAL noted that of the 13 members
of the U.S. Representatives that lost re-election bids, nine were pro-life,
and four were pro-choice.10  A study conducted by the Alan
Guttmacher Institute of the 1974 House races found that, in "competi-
tive" districts, 92 percent of the pro-choice candidates studied were re-
elected while only 61 percent of the pro-life candidates were returned to
Congress. Among Republicans, 58 percent of the pro-life candidates
(hereinafter cited as Federalism Amendment) (proposed Hatch Amendment to the Constitution
and Helms Human Life Bill proposed in Congress; Hatch Amendment approved by Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution; awaiting Senate action); National Right to Life
News, April 22, 1982, at 8 (pro-life activists plan convention, organized lobbying in favor of
pro-life legislation and organized political efforts on behalf of favored condidates). See also
infira p. 33.
8. See, e.g., Herbers, Anti-A borttonists'Impact is Felt in Elections Across the Nation, N.Y. Times,
June 20, 1978, at A1, col. 1; BI0, col. 2. (Iowa Pro-Life Action Council, seeking defeat of pro-
choice Democratic Senator Dick Clark in 1978, distributed 300,000 pro-life pamphlets at
church services, primarily Roman Catholic services, Sunday before election). Both pro-choice
and pro-life groups have concentrated on direct mail, targeted leafletting, and telephone can-
vassing efforts against their congressional foes. Id. at B10, col. 5; Weinraub, Million-Dollar
Drive Aims to Oust Five Liberal Senators, N.Y. Times, March 24, 1980, at B6, col. 3; Knight, Drive
for Abortion Rights Begins, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1980, at A12, col. 4.
In response to questionnaires concerning this study, only 32 of 190 respondent congres-
sional candidates stated that they had issued press releases on the abortion issue, a rather
surprising result in light of the public attention generally devoted to the issue.
9. In the wake of the 1978 elections, pro-life activism was credited with Republican Roger
Jepson's unseating of Democrat Dick Clark in Iowa, and the defeat of pro-choice candidates
Minnette Doderer (who was favored to win the Iowa Democratic lieutenant gubernatorial
primary) and Clifford Case (who sought the Republican re-nomination to run for U.S. Sena-
tor, a post he had held for 20 years). See Herbers, supra note 8, at Al, col. 1. But see Pro-abortion
Candidates Win in Prnaries, 1980 CONG. QTRLY WEEKLY RPT. 2775 (In two U.S. House Dem-
ocratic primaries in Massachusetts, "The [Roman Catholic] church attempted to turn voters
away from the pro-abortion stands of two liberals-5th District incumbent James M. Shan-
non and state Rep. Barney Frank, who was running in the 4th District. But the effort
backfired, and both candidates won their Democratic primaries over conservative, anti-abor-
tion challengers.").
10. See supra note 2, at 47. At this point, we wish to sound a cautionary note. In all
studies that seek to examine the electoral fortunes of those with pro-choice and pro-life voting
records, including our own, a researcher's characterization of a politician's voting record or
issue stand as clearly "pro-choice" or "pro-life" may not be realized or shared by the electo-
rate. See infra pp. 14-18.
Yale Law & Policy Review
won while the only pro-choice Republican in the sample lost. Of the
Democrats studied, 100 percent of the pro-choice incumbents won while
75 percent of the pro-life members were re-elected."1 Overall, 98 per-
cent (61 of 62) of the pro-choice members won while 81 percent (92 of
113) of the pro-life members prevailed.' 2
An investigation which looks only at victory or defeat must, by design,
obscure valuable information. For example, candidate A may be pro-
life while incumbent candidate B is pro-choice. Incumbent B is re-
elected, so everyone assumes that the abortion issue did not harm him.
If, however, candidates from B's party normally collect 56 percent of the
vote, but B received only 50.1 percent, it is obvious that something-
perhaps the abortion issue-hampered B's performance.13 Furthermore,
the partisan tides in the 1974 election may undermine the reliability of
the Guttmacher study results. 14 As most Republican candidates are
pro-life and most Democratic candidates are pro-choice,' 5 any general
tendency favoring Democrats will favor the pro-choice position.
A review of the existing literature reveals an absence of any attempt
to examine, for legislative races, overall shifts in the general electorate's
voting behavior engendered by the abortion issue.' 6 This study seeks to
11. Rosoff, Is Support of Abortion Political Suicide? 7 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 1, 15
(1975). The Guttmacher study used as its sample the 107 seats considered competitive by
Congressional Quarterly Service in 1974 and added 12 seats in which the incumbent had
received less than 55 percent of the 1972 vote, creating a total sample of 119 House seats.
12. Id. at 16-17.
13. To some extent, the Guttmacher Institute study's focus on "competitive" seats may
minimize the tendency of a won-lost study to obscure underlying shifts in voting behavior.
Nevertheless, a study that examines change in normal vote will reveal more than a study of
only incumbent survival.
14. The aftermath of Watergate, President Nixon's resignation, and President Ford's par-
don of Nixon helped to make 1974 a banner year for Democrats, who won substantial gains in
Congress, often at the expense of Republicans identified too closely with Nixon. See generally
M. BARONE AND G. UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1976 (1975). An un-
usually high number of House incumbents-40---were defeated in 1974. Three-fourths of
them were Republicans. Congressional Quarterly Service, 1974 CONG. QTRLY ALMANAC 845
(1975).
15. See Rosoff, supra note 11, at 15-18 (Most Republicans in sample pro-life, while most
Democrats in sample pro-choice); see infra pp. 16-18 (in our sample, Democrats, both incum-
bents and challengers, far more likely to be pro-choice than Republicans).
16. The most detailed empirical study of the abortion issue in elections concerns the 1976
Carter-Ford campaign. See Vinovskis, Abortion and the Presidential Election of 1976 A Mul-
tivariate Analysis of Voting Behavior, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1750 (1979), reprinted in C. SCHNEIDER
AND M. VINOVSKIs, THE LAW AND POLITICS OF ABORTION 184 (1980) (hereinafter cited as
SCHNEIDER AND VINOVSKIS). Vinovskis concluded that abortion "was never a very impor-
tant concern of voters during the 1976 Presidential campaign." d. at 1767, 201. Vinovskis
applied multiple classification analysis, (see note 35 infra) to presidential preference polling
data. Holding other factors constant, Vinovskis tested 12 respondent traits, including views
on abortion, and determined that a voter's attitude on abortion made little difference in his
presidential voting decision. "In fact," noted Vinovskis, "the voter's attitude on abortion was
the weakest of all predictors." Id. at 1766, 200. The two strongest predictors were party
identification and ideology. Id. at 1766, 1769; 200, 203.
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partially fill this gap in the study of abortion's impact on American poli-
tics. In particular, we determined that an empirical examination em-
ploying interval data 17 derived from federal general election contests
would enable us to assess the electoral impact of this obviously promi-
nent and divisive issue. We chose to study congressional elections be-
cause Congress has become the focus of pro-life efforts to make abortion
illegal and to restrict its availability.' 8 Furthermore, data concerning
these contests was available on a more widespread basis than was infor-
mation regarding state and local contests. In addition, examining a
cross-section of the congressional races provides the reader with informa-
tion regarding the impact of the abortion issue in different regions of the
nation.
II. An Empirical Examination of the Abortion Issue in Congressional Contests
A. Sample, Terms, and Methodology
A group of election contests to be studied was selected. This group
included (1) all 197.6 U.S. Senators and Representatives seeking re-elec-
tion who had a clear and consistent voting record on the abortion issue
and (2) all 1976 races for U.S. Senator and Representative in which no
incumbents were running and where the contestants adopted a clear
abortion position.
17. Social scientists generally refer to three different levels, or degrees, of measurement
used to study social phenomena. The first, nominal measurement, merely classifies items with
respect to a certain characteristic so that the grouping is as homogeneous as possible as com-
pared with differences between categories. Dividing voters according to sex, race, or political
party affiliation is an example of nominal categorization. It is the simplest level of measure-
ment. Where the trait to be studied is composed of categories that differ in the degree to
which they possess a certain characteristic but where the precise magnitude of those differ-
ences can not be measured on a scale, the categories may be ranked according to an ordinal
scale of measurement. With ordinal data, we can rank the categories (e.g., lower class, middle
class, upper class, varying in the amount of socioeconomic status they possess) but we can not
gauge the exact distance between the groups. Where the trait to be studied may be ranked
not only with respect to the degree to which the data possesses a certain characteristic, but
also according to the difference in magnitude of the characteristic, such data can be given an
itjerval level of measurement. Voting percentages constitute interval data. If candidate A
receives 40 percent of the vote, we know exactly how much better he did than candidate B,
who got 20 percent of the vote. Where it is possible to locate an absolute or nonarbitrary zero
point on the interval scale, the interval data may also be studied according to a ratio scale of
measurement, which is the higher level of interval measurement. Voting percentages satisfy
the criteria for ratio scale measurement as well; receiving zero percent of the popular vote in
an election is quite absolute. Thus, we know in the example above that candidate A did twice
as well as candidate B. (As a contrasting example, Fahrenheit temperature is an interval
measure but not a ratio measure; 70 degrees is not twice as hot as 35 degrees, it is merely 35
degrees hotter). See H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 15-20 (2d ed. 1972). Thus, the levels of
measurement are, in descending level of quality and information value: ratio-interval; inter-
val; ordinal; and nominal.
18. See Federalism Amendment, supra note 7, at 9.
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The incumbents in the first subgroup were selected by using the abor-
tion position ratings compiled by the Alan Guttmacher Institute in
1976. These ratings looked at whether a member of Congress had spon-
sored an amendment to outlaw abortion and at four votes in each cham-
ber that dealt with the abortion issue. Sponsorship or a consistently pro-
life voting record in the four votes studied classified a Senator or Repre-
sentative as pro-life. Those members of Congress who did not sponsor a
constitutional amendment and voted consistently pro-choice in the rat-
ing's four votes were classified as pro-choice.
These criteria yielded a group of 78 Senators with clearly defined
abortion positions (48 pro-choice and 30 pro-life). In the House, 157
members appeared to have consistent stands on the issue: 43 were pro-
choice, and 114 were pro-life.
To determine the abortion positions of the non-incumbent candidates
challenging the incumbents included in our sample and the views of
those competing for open Senate and House seats, a questionnaire was
sent to all non-incumbents in the group of races studied. The question-
naire asked if each respondent agreed or disagreed with the Supreme
Court's 1973 Roe decision. Those who disagreed with the Court's stance
and supported legislative attempts to overrule Roe were considered pro-
life and coded according to their preferred means of prohibiting
abortion. 19
Races were deleted from the sample for several reasons: there was not
a candidate from each major party entered in the contest; candidates in
the contest whose abortion position was not known did not respond to
the study's questionnaire; a proper Catholic index for the district could
not be developed; etc. After the original sample was examined closely,
187 contests with full data constituted the final sample.
20
19. Listed on the questionnaire as pro-choice options were: (1) a constitutional amend-
ment flatly prohibiting all abortion (hereinafter a "total prohibition amendment");.(2) a con-
stitutional amendment prohibiting abortion except in those cases in which the pregnant
woman's life would be endangered if the pregnancy were continued to term (hereinafter re-
ferred to as a "Buckley-like amendment") after former Senator James Buckley, perhaps the
politician most identified with this type of pro-life measure; (3) a constitutional amendment
allowing each state to regulate or prohibit abortion as it desired (hereinafter the "States'
Rights amendment"); (4) any "Other" type of amendment restricting abortion; and (5) equal
support of "Both" the total prohibition amendment and the Buckley-like amendment. At the
time these questionnaires were drafted and sent to congressional candidates, the above op-
tions, all involving constitutional amendment, constituted the pro-life movement's efforts to
overrule Roe v. Wade, supra note 1. Since that time, several developments have occured. See
Federahm Amendment,supra note 7, at 10-14.
20. As we noted earlier, the original Guttmacher rating of incumbent legislators con-
tained 157 House seats and 78 Senate seats that comprised the bulk of this study's beginning
sample. Additionally, 48 open House and Senate seats were included in the study.
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B. Examination of Abortion's Impact on General Election Results
To best study the electoral impact of the abortion issue, it must be
examined in terms of change in the normal party vote. The principal
deficiency of prior studies has been that they examined only whether a
congressman won or lost, rather than the margin of that victory or de-
feat and its relation to the normal partisan tendencies of the seat in
question. 2
1
Because the effect of the abortion issue may be subtle rather than
obvious, this study analyzed the issue's electoral effect by means of a
regression equation. 22 We compared the Republican and Democratic
base vote for each district with the 1976 vote in terms of the candidates'
21. See, e.g., Rosoff, supra note 11.
22. Linear regression equations describe the best line, if any, that can be drawn among
the points of a graph plotting data concerning one or more independent variables against
data concerning a particular dependent variable, such as candidate views on abortion. The
explanatory value of such an equation is related to how closely the plot of the data resembles
a particular pattern and not a random arrangement of points. Specific calculations reveal the
level of statistical significance of the equation--the probability that the pattern was not a
random one. Further calculations can show the percent of variation in the fact one seeks to
explain for which the independent variables are responsible-the closeness of the pattern of
data to the line represented by the equation. See H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 384-86 (2d
ed. 1972); Kim & Kohout, "Multiple Regression Analysis" Subprogram Regression, in SPSS: STA-
TISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 320, 321-23 (2d. ed. 1975).
The statistical significance of a regression equation is identified by its T-score. When com-
pared to the size of the relevant sample, the T-score reports the probability that the relation-
ship represented by the equation occurs randomly. This is the level of statistical significance
of the equation. Thus, if an equation is statistically significant at the .01 level, the chance
that it results from a random distribution is only 1%. See Kim & Kohout, supra, at 334-36.
Commonly cited as conservative acceptable levels are .05, .01, and .001. See H. BLALOCK,
supra, at 161.
Also of value in analyzing a regression equation is the R2 score. The sum of the squares of
the distances between the actual data points plotted for the sample and those predicted by
the regression equation, R 2 represents the proportion of variation in the dependent variable
that can be explained by the regression equation. For example, an equation with an R
2 of .10
is said to explain 10% of the variation in a dependent variable. See Kim & Kohout, supra, at
279.
The R2 and T-scores help identify the importance of each of the independent variables.
The variable's T-score measures the statistical significance of its contribution to the entire
equation. Also available for each independent variable are measures of their strength and
direction. The b coefficient, or slope, describes the unit change in the dependent variable
resulting from a unit change in the independent variable. A large coefficient indicates a
strong independent variable. The sign of the coefficient indicates whether the direction of the
independent variable's correlation with the dependent variable is positive or negative. Id. at
323, 300.
The three independent variables tested in our model were not entered into the regression
equation in any preordained order. Rather, the three variables "competed" in the SPSS
program to be the first variable used to construct a line fitted to the cases of data observed. In
effect, the most explanatory independent variable was used to construct the initial fitted line,
then the second best variable entered the equation, followed by the third. This is important
because the first independent variable entered into a regression equation sets the parameters
of the equation. Though the second variable entered will alter those parameters to accommo-
date its impact upon the dependent variable, entry of a less explanatory variable prior to one
with greater explanatory power will reduce the second variable's b-slope and scores of statisti-
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abortion stances,23 the Catholic index of the district, and the education
index of the district.
The general formula for the equation is:
1976 Vote = B, Base + B Education + B CatholicVote Index + Index
In order to utilize this regression model, construction of a base vote, a
Catholic index, and an education index was required. The Catholic
voting group was studied because public opinion polls show Catholics to
more frequently hold pro-life views. 24 Similarly, college-educated voters
as a group show greater pro-choice sentiment than any other definable
demographic bloc.
25
Of course, these groups are not mutually exclusive, but they are
clearly definable enough to facilitate scrutiny.2 6 If any group were to
exhibit a change in voting behavior correlated to the abortion stance of
congressional candidates, it would likely be one of these two.
Base Vote
For each of the House and Senate seats studied a base, or average,
vote for both Republican and Democratic candidates was constructed.
The "normal" vote was obtained by averaging the Republican and
Democratic vote total in the district for the past three elections in the
case of House seats. For Senate seats, the past four elections were aver-
cal significance, thereby masking its full correlation with the independent variable. See H.
BLALOCK, supra, at 364-93. We'are confident that such masking did not occur in this study.
23. To facilitate the use of this regression formula for the examination of subsamples
based upon the candidates' abortion positions, all pro-life options were categorized into one
over-all pro-life classification. If this recoding were not done, most of the pro-life categories
(all but the Buckley-like amendment) would have possessed subsamples too small to produce
reliable results.
24. See M. HANNA, CATHOLICS AND AMERICAN POLITICS 167 (1980).
25. See M. HANNA, supra note 24, at 169 (college graduates in Catholic, Protestant, and
Jewish ethnic groups are more likely to favor legalized abortion than are those with a high
school education or less).
26. In the sample employed in this study, there was no significant multicolinearity be-
tween the Catholic Index (Cathin) and the Education Index (Educin) used in the regression
model. That is, the relative proportion of Catholic voters in the voting areas in our sample
was not closely correlated to the relative proportion of voters over 25 with four years or more
of college. Multicolinear independent variables may produce misleading regression models
because the independent variables tend to move in step, making it difficult to discern which
independent variable is truly correlated with the dependent variable. See H. BLALOCK, supra
note 22, at 456-65. See also Blalock, Correlated Independent Variables: The Problem of Mul-
ticolinearity, in THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS 418 (E. Tufte ed. 1970).
The finding of little correlation between Cathin and Educin in this study reflects observed
reality. Proportionately, Protestants have more college education than do Catholics. See
Lazerwitz, A Comparison of Maor United States Religons, 56 J. OF THE AM. STATISTICAL ASSN.
568 (1961) (nine percent of Protestants had four years or more of college compared with five
percent of Catholics with equivalent college); M. HANNA, supra note 24, at Ill (education gap
between those under 30 is smaller, but Catholics still trail Protestants in educational level).
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aged to arrive at the normal vote. With the base vote available as a
means of comparison, the actual 1976 vote for each House or Senate seat
studied was also compiled and recorded.
Catholic Index
For each contest to be studied, an index indicating the relative size of
the Roman Catholic population in each district was constructed. Un-
fortunately, the U.S. Census Bureau does not record religious affiliation
when conducting a census, and to the authors' knowledge, no agency or
organization keeps such data in terms of congressional district makeup.
An accurate measure of the relative Catholic population in the dis-
tricts studied can be created, however, by employing the data on "For-
eign Stock" population of each district in The Congressional District Data
Book, 1973. For each House and Senate contest in this study, foreign
stock population was divided into "Catholic" and "Non-Catholic" ac-
cording to the religious preference of the countries of foreign origin.
27
The Catholic foreign stock population was then divided by the district's
total population. Although the resulting figure was, of course, very low,
it nevertheless enabled the ranking of each district in our study accord-
ing to its relative Catholic voting strength. This Catholic index (Cathin)
was then available to be used to analyze the effect of the abortion issue
on Catholic voters.
As a check on the accuracy of this study's Cathin index, the index was
compared to the religious affiliation figures of the book, Churches and
Church Membership in the United States, authored by the Glenmary Insti-
tute of Washington, D.C. The Glenmary book contained data on
church membership by county, rather than congressional district. Some
congressional districts in this study did not violate county boundaries, or
did so only minimally. Eleven of these districts were used to construct a
27. Austria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, and Yugoslavia were deemed so predominantly Catholic that all residents from
these countries were classified as Catholic. Denmark, Finland, Greece, Lithuania, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. were classified as
entirely non-Catholic. Other countries were treated as special cases: Germany (one-half to
Catholic group; one-half to non-Catholic group); Canada (New England residents considered
Catholic; others one-half to Catholic group and one-half to non-Catholic group).
Beyond the assignment of foreign stock Americans into religious groups, another problem is
presented. We must assume that the foreign stock population of a Congressional district or
state is fairly representative of the district or state population as a whole. Though American
immigration patterns change over time, the change has not been great during the past cen-
tury. Most United States immigrants during the past thirty years have come from countries
in Southern and Eastern Europe and Germany, as has been the case since the late 1800s. See
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT 47-49 (1968) (table of
U.S. Immigration figures by decade). It is therefore reasonable to assume that the current
immigration and foreign stock populations reflect the entire area's population makeup, at
least religiously, if not economically or socially.
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Catholic population figure derived from the Glenmary book. The Cath-
olic population totals for these districts were compared to the Cathin
index derived from the foreign stock data. Correlation (Pearson's R)
between the two measures was .96, which suggests that the foreign stock
Catholic index is an excellent surrogate. We therefore use the Cathin
index without reservation. Appendix A discusses in detail the construc-
tion and verification of this index.
Education Index
Level of education appears to significantly affect attitudes toward
abortion. 28 For this reason an education index (Educin) was con-
structed in order to enable analysis of each contest studied according to
the education level of the district. In each district or state in the study
sample, the number of persons having four or more years of college
29
was divided by the total number of persons older than 25 living in the
district or state. The resulting index provides a good indication of the
overall education level of the district as well as the voting strength of the
highly educated in that district.
C. Anatsis of the Abortion Issue Through a Linear Regression Model of the
House and Senate Contests
We performed a regression analysis using the data and model de-
scribed above. These results are presented in Table 1. The b-slope coef-
ficients and t-scores of each variable are shown from the Republican
perspective; that is in terms of their effect within a voting model predict-
ing the fortunes of a GOP candidate.
28. See M. HANNA, supra note 24, at 169; 1 U.S. COMM'N ON POPULATION GROWTH &
THE AMERICAN FUTURE, DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF POPULATION GROWTH
572-77 (1972).
29. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT DATA BOOK (1973).
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TABLE 1
ABORTION STUDY MODEL INVOLVING BASE
VOTE, EDUCATION INDEX, AND
CATHOLIC INDEX
Sample Examined Base Educin Cathin
All contests .774 .001 -. 003
N = 187 (16.6*) (.579) (-2.64*)
Contests involving incumbents .934 .002 -. 003
N = 138 (18.5*) (1.01) (-2.28*)
Open Seats .357 .002 -. 0023o
N = 49 (3.96*) (.715) (-.851)
Pro-choice Republican vs. Pro-life .645 .003 -. 003
Democrat (2.24*) (.280) (-1.12)
N= 11
Pro-life Republican vs. Pro-choice .897 .001 -. 002
Democrat (12.8*) (.432) (-1.29)
N = 68
Pro-choice Republican vs. Pro-choice .831 .001 -. 003
Democrat (5.91*) (.145) (-.964)
N = 36
Pro-life Republican vs. Pro-life Democrat .585 .004 -. 004
N = 50 (5.79*) (.722) (-1.26)
*indicates statistical significance at the .05 level. 3 1
30. Readers will note that the Cathin variable is statistically significant at the .05 level for
the regression model involving all contests in the study and in the regression model
concerning contests involving incumbents. Thereafter, the Cathin variable lacks statistical
significance in the other regressions. This latter set of subgroups involves smaller Ns of cases
than do the total sample and the incumbents subsample. One might therefore speculate that
the Cathin variable loses its statistical significance only because of the small size of the open
seat and abortion match-up subsamples. This, however, is not the case. As shown by a
standard table of the distribution of t-scores, sample size does not greatly affect whether a
given t-score will be statistically significant once the sample exceeds 30. See, e.g., H.
BLALOCK, supra note 22, at 559. With a sample size of 30, for example, a t-score of 1.697 is
required to achieve .05 level of statistical significance in a one-tailed t-test; with a sample of
infinite number, the required t-score is lowered to 1.645. By contrast, increasing a sample
from 10 to 30 decreases the required .05 level t-score from 1.812 to 1.697. As can be observed
in Table 7, the t-scores of Cathin in both the total sample and the incumbents subsample are
well above the 1.645 minimum required for statistical significance at the .05 level, while the
Cathin t-scores for all other contests fall far short of the magnitude required for .05
significance. Even in the subsample pitting pro-choice Republicans against pro-life
Democrats (N-11), the resulting t-score of 1.12 falls notably short of the 1.796 t-score
required for statistical significance at the .05 level.
31. As discussed in note 26supra, there was no substantial correlation between the Educin
variable and the Cathin variables. Neither was there a substantial difference in the range of
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As the model shows, the normal base vote is the only independent
variable that is statistically significant. The Cathin variable achieves
statistical significance only in two regression equations that do not in-
clude the abortion position variable. The Educin variable never
achieves statistical significance. Our analysis suggests that the normal
party vote of a congressional district or state provides an excellent pre-
dictor of the next election's outcome, but that the abortion stands of
candidates provide no reliable guidance as to election results.
When the abortion control is introduced, there is little change in the
estimated values of the B, coefficients and no change at all that is ac-
companied by significant t scores. The abortion stance of a candidate
apparently does not significantly affect the normal voting patterns of an
election district.
This indicates that the abortion issue, despite its publicity, contro-
versy, and importance to interest groups, has not disrupted established
partisan voting patterns. We wish to emphasize the higher B, coeffi-
cient contained in the regression for the contests involving incumbents.
This suggests that the stabilizing influence of normal partisan voting
patterns is further strengthened by the presence of an incumbent legisla-
tor whose name identification and political philosophy is well estab-
lished with the electorate.
The B2 coefficients of Cathin in the two equations in which this varia-
ble is statistically significant (the regression for all contests in the sam-
ple, and the regression for all sample contests involving an incumbent
seeking re-election) is of an expected direction and magnitude. In these
equations the Republican share of the vote is diminished in proportion
to the relative number of Catholic voters in the district or state. These
regression equations confirm the conventional wisdom: most, Catholics
vote for Democrats. As previously noted, these two regression equations
did not address the candidates' abortion positions.
For all regressions presented in Table 1 the B coefficients for Cathin
and Educin are of the expected direction and magnitude even though
they are, for the most part, not statistically significant. As predicted, all
of the B2 and B3 coefficients have different signs because Catholic voters
are normally Democrats and college-educated voters are normally
these variables across the districts and states in our sample. That is, the difference in magni-
tude between the most educated electoral area and the least educated electoral area was not
much smaller than the difference between the most Catholic and the least Catholic cases in
our sample. Thus, it is unlikely that the Cathin variable in the sample as a whole and the
incumbents subsample receives a higher b-slope coefficient than the Educin variable due to
the "pulling" effect of extremely Catholic or non-Catholic cases. Scattergram analysis of the
data supports our hypothesis that cases with unusually high or low Educin and Cathin values
did not alter the shape of the regression model.
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Republicans.3 2 One would expect, therefore, the regression model to
show pro-choice Republicans gaining a greater share of the college-edu-
cated vote while losing even more Catholic votes than normal. By the
same token, a pro-life Democrat could be expected to gain a greater
share of the Catholic vote than Democrats usually get, but do worse
among the college-educated than most candidates of his party. B coeffi-
cients obtained in the regressions are inconclusive on this issue and not
statistically significant. However, while the B2 and B3 coefficients ob-
tained seem to confirm the conventional wisdom concerning Republican
strength with college-educated voters and Democratic strength with
Catholic voters, they would not, even if statistically significant, suggest
that a candidate's abortion stance alters these partisan demographic
relations.
The R2 of the equations, which ranges from .40 to .75, shows a good
but not perfect fit between the outcomes predicted by the regression
models and the observed reality of the 1976 election outcomes. This
suggests that election outcomes are sufficiently complex that it is un-
likely that they can be fully explained by even a multi-factor regression
model, let alone a single factor such as candidate abortion stance. In
addition, more than 90 percent of the observed R2 values are attributed
to the base vote variable. The Educin and Cathin variables do not sig-
nificantly improve the fit between the regression model's predicted re-
sults and the actual election results. We conclude that, in federal
general elections as a whole, candidate performance is not affected by
candidate abortion stance. We suspect that the abortion issue may be-
come more important in primary elections where turnout is lower and
one-issue voters can make their numbers felt without deserting their
party.3
3
D. An Analysis of the Sample.: Candidate Views on Abortion," Partisan
Di#rencesy Candidate Match-ups
Examination of the sample illustrates the extreme differences between
32. See M. HANNA, supra note 24, at 169.
33. Many observers attribute former Minnesota congressman Donald Fraser's defeat in
the 1978 U.S. Senate Democratic Farmer-Labor primary to pro-life activism on behalf of his
opponent, millionaire businessman Bob Short. Short lost the general election to pro-life In-
dependent-Republican David Durenberger, giving Short an 0-for-3 record in general elec-
tions (for congressman, lieutenant governor, and senator). Fraser had won eight general
elections to Congress and has since been twice elected Mayor of Minneapolis by wide mar-
gins. However, we note with passing irony that the DFL Feminist Caucus, upset with Short's
pro-life, anti-ERA views and his vigorous attacks on the pro-choice, pro-ERA Fraser, openly
campaigned against Short in the general election against pro-life Republican David
Durenberger, who won the Senate seat with 62 percent of the vote. Demise of Hubert's DFL,
TIME, Nov. 20, 1978, at 21.
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Republican and Democratic candidates concerning the abortion issue.
More than 71 percent of the GOP contestants expressed support for
some type of legislative action to prohibit abortion. Less than one-third
of the Republican candidates studied (28.2 percent) supported the 1973
pro-choice decision of the Supreme Court.
Among the Democrats studied, a far different picture emerges. More
than 60 percent of the Democrats supported the Roe decision; only 37.6
percent endorsed pro-life measures. As Table 2 indicates, Democrats in
the contests studied were more than twice as likely to be pro-choice as
were Republicans.
TABLE 2
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ABORTION
STANCES FOR ALL RACES
Percentage of Position-Holders by Party
Abortion
Category Republican Democrat
0) Pro-Choice 28.2 62.4
1) Total Prohibition 1.1 .6
2) Buckley-like amendment 51.7 28.1
3) States' Rights 11.5 4.5
4) Other 5.7 2.2
5) Both (Options 2 and 3) 1.7 2.2
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
N = 174 N = 178
A simple crosstabulation of the abortion positions of the Republican
and Democratic candidates is shown in Table 3. One-fifth of the con-
tests studied involved two pro-choice candidates. Another third of the
contests studied involved two pro-life candidates.
In total, about half of the congressional contests involved candidates
who shared similar positions on the abortion issue. Nearly another half
of the contests involved a pro-choice Democrat against a pro-life Repub-
lican. The partisan differences are striking in the match-ups presenting
a clash of candidate abortion stances. Equally striking is the frequent
absence of candidate clash on this issue.
In only about one-half of these election contests was the electorate
provided with a clear choice on the abortion issue. In order to examine
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Republican Pro- Ban All Buckley- States'
Position Choice Abortion Like Rights Other Both
0) Pro-choice 21.6 0 6.0 1.2 0 0
1) Total Prohibition 0 0 1.2 0 0 0
2) Buckley-like
amendment 26.3 .6 18.6 1.8 1.8 1.2
3) States' Rights 9.0 0 1.2 .6 .6 .6
4) Other 4.8 0 .6 0 0 .6
5) Both
(Options 2 and 3) .6 0 1.2 0 0 0
TOTAL - 100.0 N=167
these match-ups in a bit more detail, crosstabulations were also per-
formed using subsamples determined by incumbency. In the races in-
volving incumbent Senators or Representatives, there were fewer
matches of equivalent abortion positions (37.6 percent) than in the sam-
ple as a whole and, consequently, a slightly higher percentage of direct
clashes between pro-choice and pro-life candidates.
Conversely, in the contests involving two non-incumbent candidates
there were fewer differences in the abortion stands of the major party
candidates. In half of these cases, there was no difference at all between
the two challengers; voters who wished to make a voting decision based
solely on candidate abortion position were out of luck. We emphasize,
however, that such a voter was only slightly better off participating in
the elections involving incumbents, where the candidate abortion posi-
tions were congruent nearly forty percent of the time. There appears to
be a tendency for the abortion stances of the major party opponents to
converge, perhaps as a tacit means of neutralizing the issue. This ten-
dency, however, is most pronounced among non-incumbents who are
facing a difficult-and for them, untested-issue.
This characteristic varied somewhat by region. The incidence of con-
gruent candidate abortion positions ranged from 30.7 percent in the
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South 34 to 48.0 percent in the East.3 5 The Western 36 races experienced
41.9 percent congruence while 38.7 percent of the Midwestern 37 contests
involved two candidates with the same abortion stands. In the South,
East, and West, most abortion stance match-ups involved two pro-
choice candidates; in the Midwest, most involved two pro-life candi-
dates. In all four regions, most contests where candidates held different
abortion views pitted a pro-choice Democrat against a pro-life Republi-
can. In political battles, many perceive safety in sameness. The high
incidence of congruent abortion positions held by opponents, especially
non-incumbent opponents, would seem to indicate that no small
number of political actors believe this dictum and strive for its
fulfillment.
The partisan differences in abortion views are somewhat counterintui-
tive. We might expect Democrats, who enjoy disproportionate support
among Catholic voters, to tend toward the pro-life position while ex-
pecting Republicans, who enjoy disproportionate support among the
college-educated 3 to tend toward the pro-choice position. As we have
seen, exactly the opposite occurs: most Democratic candidates are pro-
choice and most Republican candidates are pro-life. This relationship
may not be consistent with components of the parties' constituencies
(the college-educated and the Catholic) but it is consistent with party
ideology. Democrats are generally more liberal than Republicans. The
pro-choice abortion stand is generally considered the liberal viewpoint
on this issue; the pro-life perspective is generally regarded as the con-
servative stand. Apparently, candidate views on abortion are more af-
fected by their overall political ideology than by their parties' bases of
support.
In the districts that are overwhelmingly Republican (those in which
34. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia.
35. Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia.
36. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mex-
ico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
37. Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wisconsin.
38. See Ladd, Shifting Party Coalitions 1932-1976, in EMERGING COALITIONS IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 81, 87, 98 (S. Lipset ed. 1978) (hereinafter cited as Lipset) (college-educated voters
are more likely to identify themselves as Republicans; majority of college-educated voters
have supported GOP presidential candidate since 1948); VINOSKIS, supra note 16, at 1769,
203 (Jimmy Carter ran better with college educated voters than most Democrats have, see
Orren, Candidate Style and Voter Alignment, reprinted in Lipset, supra at 127, but Gerald Ford
nevertheless carried the college-educated subgroup of voters). See aLso supra p. 10 explaining
the education index constructed for this study and the association between college experience
and pro-choice views.
Vol. 1: 1, 1982
Examination of Abortion Issue
more than 60 percent of the vote normally went to the GOP)3 9 the Re-
publican candidates studied were overwhelmingly pro-life, even more
than Republicans as a group, as Table 4 indicates. This partisan "over-
typicality" was reversed among Democratic candidates in our sample,
however. In districts where the normal vote was more than 60 percent
Democratic, the Democratic candidates, though still predominantly
pro-choice, were less likely to support the Roe decision than were Demo-
cratic candidates as a whole.
TABLE 4
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ABORTION STANCES
IN SAFE (BASE VOTE OF MORE THAN 60 PERCENT)
REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC SEATS
Percentage of Position-Holders by Party
Abortion
Category Republican Democrat
0) Pro-Choice 7.7 53.5
1) Total Prohibition 0 1.4
2) Buckley-like amendment 59.0 32.4
3) States' Rights 23.1 5.6
4) Other 5.1 1.4
5) Both (Options 2 and 3) 5.1 5.6
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
N= 36 N= 71
One would initially suspect that "safe" Republican districts have an un-
usually educated and pro-choice electorate while safe Democratic dis-
tricts are more heavily Catholic and pro-life. Democratic candidates
running in "safe" races behave in a manner closer to that predicted, but
Republican candidates in "safe" areas do not. This seeming contradic-
tion in regard to Republicans has a likely explanation, however. Safe
Republican districts tend to be more rural than competitive or Demo-
cratic districts are,4° but rural areas contain a smaller proportion of col-
39. See supra p.8 -9 for an explanation of the normal or "base" vote calculated for the
states and congressional districts in this study.
40. See Greeley, Catholics and Coalitions, in Lipset, supra note 38, at 276 ("The Republicans
have historically been the party of the small city, the town, the upstate regions of the North-
east and North Central part of the Central States, . . . [and of] the well-to-do farmer.").
Orren, supra note 38, at 165, 174; Jensen, The Search for Modem Values, in Lipset, supra note 38,
at 35 (farmers and rural residents support GOP); M. VINOVSKIS, supra note 16, at 1769, 203
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lege-educated voters than suburban and urban areas.4 1 Thus, a higher
percentage of GOP voters in the safe GOP areas probably hold Republi-
can views because of the general conservatism of rural areas, socioeco-
nomic (SES) factors other than education (e.g., income, religion,
ethnicity), and local voting tradition rather than because of their educa-
tional background.
Many of the upper-SES Republican voters found to exist in national
or statewide surveys are likely to reside in urban and suburban areas-
regions containing Democratic or competitive congressional seats rather
than safe Republican seats. If this hypothesis is correct, Republicans in
the safe GOP areas may take pro-life views without alienating a large
portion of the party's college educated constituency as much of that con-
stituency does not reside in the safe Republican districts. Furthermore,
as our regression model suggests, the abortion issue probably is not sali-
ent to the upper-education voters that disproportionately vote
Republican.
Democratic candidates in safe areas, however, are predictably less
pro-choice than Democratic candidates as a whole. 42 One predicts this
because many safe Democratic areas are also heavily Catholic and ur-
ban.4 3 Though normally inclined to support Democrats, Catholics are
also inclined to hold pro-life views. Urban Catholics have generally
held more pronounced pro-life views than suburban Catholics. 44 In
light of this information, many Democratic candidates in heavily Catho-
lic party strongholds probably believe that the Catholic electorate's par-
tisan tendencies would yield to concern over the abortion issue.
Furthermore, many of the Democrats seeking office in safe districts may
be members of the Catholic church and/or hold pro-life views regardless
of political considerations.
4 5
(Gerald Ford beat Jimmy Carter by significant margins in towns of less than 50,000
population).
41. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
3 (Series P-20, No. 356, 1980) (12 percent of metropolitan population more than 25 years old
has completed four or more years of college; figure in non-metropolitan areas is 7.7 percent).
42. This relationship is consistent throughout our sample.
43. See R. SCAMMON AND B. WATTENBERG, THE REAL MAJORITY 64-65 (1970); M.
HANNA, Supra note 24, at 115-18; VINOVSKIS, supra note 16, at 204 (In 1976 presidential race,
Carter beat Ford among Catholic voters despite Ford's support for States' rights pro-life
amendment); Axelrod, Where the Votes Come From. An Analys of Electoral Coalitions 1952-68, 66
AM. POL. ScI. REv. 16 (1972) ("Catholics have formed a large and reliable segment of the
Democratic coalition"). See generally J. FENTON, THE CATHOLIC VOTE (1960).
44. See M. HANNA, supra note 24, at 103-10.
45. See Vinovskis, The Pohlics ofAbortion in the House of Representatives in 1976, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 1970, 1818-20 (1979), reprinted in SCHNEIDER AND VINOVSKIS, supra note 16, at 224.
(Catholic congressmen and congressmen from rural areas more likely to exhibit pro-life voting
patterns). Rosoff, supra note 11, at 14-15 (Catholic members of House and Senate more likely
than others to sponsor a Buckley-like pro-life amendment).
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III. The Continuing Vahdzy of the Regression Model
Our empirical study suggests that a congressional candidate's abor-
tion stance will not affect his general election chances. Some observers,
viewing increased interest group activity concerning the abortion issue,
have concluded that the saliency of the issue has increased. Most such
observers assert that the pro-life forces have acquired electoral effective-
ness, 46 though some find pro-choice forces to have been equally success-
ful. 47 In order to gauge the continuing validity of our model, we will
briefly examine as case studies some prominent 1978 and 1980 races in
which abortion was thought to play a major role. We then discuss the
three major independent variables in our model-the base vote, Catho-
lic index, and education index-to determine whether national traits
regarding these variables have changed. We also analyze congressional
incumbency and public opinion poll data concerning abortion, both
before and since 1976. Then, we examine the growth in interest group
organization or financing since 1976 and the changing shape of the
abortion battle to determine whether shifting tactics, semantics, or coali-
tions might alter the model's validity in 1982.
A. The Abortion Issue in 1978 and 1980 Congressional Elections: Some Case
Observations
According to most observers, former Iowa Senator Dick Clark "paid
dearly for his liberal stand on abortion. '48 Clark was unseated in 1978
by former Lt. Governor Roger Jepson, a conservative pro-life Republi-
can businessman. Jepson won by 26,000 votes. A DES MOINES REGIS-
TER poll suggested that as many as 25,000 Iowa voters may have
supported Jepson because of his pro-life stand.49 Clark aides and Demo-
cratic activists accepted this polling inference and assumed that Clark
would have received all these votes were it not for the abortion issue.50
Jepson aides and supporters, however, viewed the contest as one of
greater ideological dimension. According to them, a coalition of con-
servative groups supported Jepson over the "ultra-liberal" Clark.
51
Basing conclusions upon casual observation and the comments of in-
46. See, e.g., Herbers, supra note 8, at AI, col. 1; Kneeland, Clark Defeat in Iowa Laid to
Abortion Issue, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1978, at A27, col. 5.
47. See, e.g., Pro-Abortion Candidates Win in Primaries, supra note 9; Golden, Abortion's Mornng
After, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1978 at A20, col. 1 (though pro-life movement could claim victories
in 1978, an equivalent number of pro-choice candidates won).
48. And the Senate Bids Farewell, TIME, Nov. 20, 1978, at 20.
49. Kneeland, supra note 46, at A18, col. 3.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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terested parties entails risk. In assessing this contest, loser Clark has an
incentive to ascribe his defeat to an unrepresentative single issue group
while winner Jepson has an interest in characterizing his triumph as a
result of overall philosophical agreement between him and the electo-
rate. The regression model of this study seeks to substitute a cross-sec-
tion of empirical data for the homilies and anecdotes that have
heretofore characterized analysis of the electoral impact of the abortion
issue. It is therefore with some trepidation that we, on the basis of the
available reports, suggest that much more than the abortion issue con-
tributed to the defeat of Clark.
Clark was a union supporter in a right-to-work state, a supporter of
comprehensive government assistance to the poor in a fiscally conserva-
tive state, a supporter of gun control in a state with a strong National
Rifle Association chapter, and a supporter of the then-controversial
Panama Canal treaty.52 Said one Jepson aid, "inflation and taxes were
the overriding things" in the election. 53 Republican party officials con-
curred in that assessment and added that both Jepson and incumbent
GOP Governor Robert Ray had benefited from an extensive get-out-
the-vote campaign. The pro-choice Ray ran 67,000 votes ahead of Jep-
son, and GOP insiders suggested that Jepson benefitted from at least
some coattail effect of the candidacy of the popular (6 terms as gover-
nor) Ray. 54 Futhermore, Clark, whose Senate voting was distinctly lib-
eral, was also tied closely to former President Jimmy Carter, an
immensely unpopular figure in Iowa.
55
In other 1978 elections, pro-choice Democratic Senator Floyd Haskell
was unseated by pro-life Republican Representative William Armstrong
in Colorado. Just across the ballot, however, prominently pro-choice
Democratic Governor Richard Lamm (he has served on Planned
Parenthood's national board) won re-election, as did Democratic Repre-
sentative Patricia Schroeder, an outspoken, pro-choice feminist. In
Michigan, Democratic pro-choice challenger Carl Levin unseated pro-
life Republican Robert Griffin. In Massachusetts, Republican Senator
Edward Brooke, an incumbent on the "hit" list of the National Right to
Life Committee because of his vociferous opposition to the Hyde
52. And the Senate Bids Farewell, supra note 48.
53. Id.
54. Kneeland, supra note 46.
55. Clark, in addition to being the Senator rated most liberal by the Americans for Demo-
cratic Action (ADA) was also the Senator who most consistently supported the Carter Admin-
istration in Senate votes. Jepson emphasized both facts throughout the campaign. Between
April, 1977 and August, 1978, Carter's approval rating in Iowa plummeted from 80 percent
to 39 percent-from 85 percent to 32 percent among farmers. See Bode, Number-One Friend,
NEW REPUBLIC, August 19, 1978, at 14.
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Amendment limiting the use of federal funds for abortions, 56 went down
to defeat to another pro-choice candidate, Democrat Paul Tsongas.
5 7
Of course, the mere victory of a pro-choice or pro-life candidate does
not indicate the saliency of the abortion issue to the electorate. News
coverage of the 1978 elections mentioned abortion as an issue in only a
very few races.5 8 An interview with the chairmen of the two major par-
ties in the fall of 1978 evoked no mention of the abortion issue.59 At a
minimum, the 1978 election failed to contradict this study's regression
model.
The election of 1980 was something of a watershed in the Senate.
Republicans captured the upper chamber, gaining 12 seats.60 In the
House, the Democrats suffered a net loss of 30 seats.6 1 Of particular
interest are the defeats of several prominent liberal Democrats who were
on the "hit" lists of pro-life activists and other conservative groups such
as the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC).
In 1980, the National Right to Life Committee targeted the following
pro-choice members of Congress for defeat:
62
Senate House
Birch Bayh (D-Indiana) John Anderson (R-Illinois)
Frank Church (D-Idaho) Mendel Davis (D-South Carolina)
Alan Cranston (D-California) Robert Drinan (D-Massachusetts)
Gary Hart (D-Colorado) Robert Edgar (D-Pennsylvania)
Jacob Javits (R-New York) Joseph Fischer (D-Pennsylvania)
Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) Kent Hance (D-Texas)
George McGovern (D-South Dakota) Harold Hollenbeck (D-New Jersey)
Robert Packwood (R-Oregon) Peter Kostmayer (D- Pennsylvania)
In the House, the pro-life targets escaped relatively unscathed. John
Anderson ran for President rather than seek re-election to the House
and captured seven percent of the national vote. Father Robert Drinan,
responding to Pope John Paul II's command that priests withdraw from
56. See Federahsm Amendment, supra note 7, for a more complete explanation of the Hyde
Amendment.
57. Golden, supra note 47.
58. See, e.g., A Senate Outlook, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1978, at 33 (no mention of abortion
issue in descriptions of Senate races in Texas, South Carolina, Minnesota, Mississippi, West
Virginia, Tennessee, Maine, Colorado, North Carolina and Massachusetts).
59. Party Chiefs Look at '78 Election, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD RP-r., Sept. 4, 1978, at 21.
60. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, 1980 ANNUAL ALMANAC 7-B (1981) (after 1980 elec-
tions, 53 GOP senators, 47 Democrats (including Virginia Independent Richard Byrd) as
compared to a 59-41 Democratic edge before the election).
61. 1d. at 13-B (before 1980 in the House: 273 Democrats; 159 Republicans; 3 vacancies;
After 1980: 243 Democrats; 192 Republicans).
62. Anti-Abortion Group Asks Defeat ofJavits and Five Others at Polls, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19,
1980, at A 1l, col. 1.
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 1:1, 1982
overt political life, retired and was replaced by pro-choice Democrat
Barney Frank.63  Mendel Davis also retired, presumably for personal
reasons. Harold Hollenbeck and Kent Hance won re-election easily.
64
Hollenbeck had the largest margin of victory in his career. 65 Robert
Edgar also won, running stronger than he had in 1978.66 Kostmayer
lost, but to another pro-choice candidate. 6 7 However, Fisher was de-
feated in a close contest 68 by a challenger who openly sought pro-life
support.
In the Senate, four of the eight pro-choice targets lost re-election bids.
Birch Bayh, Frank Church, 69 Jacob Javits, and George McGovern were
replaced by clearly pro-life Republicans. In addition, pro-choice Demo-
crats John Culver and Gaylord Nelson were also unseated by pro-life
Republicans.
Without doubt, these elections resulted in gains for the pro-life move-
ment, however, they were also gains for groups opposed to gun control,
equal rights for homosexuals, government social welfare spending, lim-
ited military budgets and liberalism in general. 70 In the six contests re-
sulting in pro-life victories, the overall ideological contrast of the
candidates was stark. Comparison of composite liberalism ratings
7' of
63. See Pro-Abortion Candidates inz in Pnmaries, supra note 9 (many voters "angered" by
seeming hypocrisy in Pope's edict that priests like Drinan withdraw from electoral politics
while local Roman Catholic leaders actively campaigned against Frank).
64. Hance was unopposed and received more than 90 percent of the vote. 14 AMERICA
VOTES 376 (1981) [hereinafter cited as AMERICA VOTES].
65. Id. at 266.
66. Id. at 340.
67. Id. at 340.
68. Id. at 396.
69. The inclusion of Church on the pro-life hit list is somewhat puzzling, as his Senate
record on abortion was, at best, mixed. He had declined to sponsor a pro-life constitutional
amendment but had several times voted in favor of efforts to curtail the use of federal funds
for abortions. Church's opponent, Republican Congressman Steve Symms, clearly supported
a pro-life amendment and had consistently cast pro-life votes on the funding questions while
in the House. However, some pro-choice activists such as Karen Mulhauser, then-president of
NARAL, characterized Church's inclusion on the pro-life hit list as "evidence of more far-
reaching right-wing aims"-a broad-based attack on liberal Democrats by a coalition of con-
servative groups which included pro-life activists. See Abortion Foes Gird For Iowa Caucuses, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 13, 1980 at A22, col. 3.
70. See Kondracke, Liberals Besieged, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1980, at 8. Of the six de-
feated pro-choice senators, all except Nelson were also targeted for defeat by NCPAC, which
spent more than a million dollars in negative saturation advertising against them. Most of
the advertisements focused on taxing and spending issues, accusing the Democratic incum-
bents of being big spenders who were too liberal to accurately represent their states' elector-
ates. See Weinraub, supra note 8.
71. The composite rating was derived by subtracting from each candidate's 1979 ADA
(Americans for Democratic Action) rating as a Senator or Representative the candidate's
1979 ACA (Americans for Constitutional Action) rating. The ADA is a liberal interest group
while the ACA is a conservative interest group. Thus, the higher the candidate's composite
score, the more liberal his overall past voting record. It was possible to draw this comparison
because the Republican challengers in five of the six contests involving the defeat of pro-
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the opponents in five of these six contests produced this lineup:
Liberalism Score
72
Pro-choice Democratic Incumbent Pro-life Republican Challenger
Indiana: Birch Bayh 86.8 12.2 Dan Quayle
Idaho: Frank Church 73.0 2.0 Steve Symms
Iowa: John Culver 92.0 13.3 Charles Grassley
South Dakota: George McGovern 90.4 13.6 James Abdnor
Wisconsin: Gaylord Nelson 89.6 14.0 Robert Kasten
In addition, the five Democrats faced other problems.73 Javits's defeat
in the primary does not implicate this study's general election regression
model. Alfons D'Amato's victory in the three-way general election race,
to the extent it reveals anything, shows that more than half the New
York voters supported a pro-choice candidate (either Liberal Javits or
Democratic Holtzman). 74 In both the Republican primary and the gen-
eral election, Javits's age (76) and health were considered substantial
factors harming his re-election chances.
75
Of the four pro-choice Senate targets who won re-election, two (Hart
and Cranston) faced pro-choice Republican opponents. Packwood, who
like Brooke was especially resented by the pro-life movement, 76 won
handily, as did Leahy.
In another Senate race that received the attention of both pro-life and
pro-choice forces, Democratic Congressman Christopher Dodd easily
defeated his Republican challenger, former New York Senator James
Buckley, the first Senate author of a pro-life constitutional amendment.
choice incumbents had served in the House (all except Republican Robert Kasten of Wison-
sin in 1979-80; his 1977-78 ratings were used).
72. Kondracke, supra note 70.
73. Bayh sought a fourth consecutive term, something Indianians had never given a Sena-
tor. GOP's Fadng Chances to Capture Congress, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD RPIT., Sept. 8, 1980, at
22. No Iowa Democratic senator has ever been re-elected. Yepsen, Iowa, NEW REPUBLIC,
October 25, 1980, at 19-20. McGovern was required to gain renomination in a divisive pri-
mary fight against a conservative Democrat heavily supported by NCPAC. Raasch, South
Dakota, NEW REPUBLIC, October 25, 1980, at 23-24. McGovern won the primary with 62
percent of the vote.
74. Senator Javits had two opponents, Republican Alfonse D'Amato, who won the New
York GOP primary, forcing Javits to run as the Liberal Party nominee, and Democratic Rep.
Elizabeth Holtzman, whose House voting record was somewhat more liberal than Javits' Sen-
ate record. See Kondrack, supra note 70.
75. GOP's Fading Chances to Capture Congress, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD RPT., Sept. 8, 1980
at 22.
76. Packwood, along with Brooke, has been an outspoken floor leader opposing the Hyde
Amendment. See Congressional Quarterly Service, Federal Funds for Abortions, 1980 CONG.
QrRLY ALMANAC 467 (1981). Packwood also has criticized the pro-life movement as a dan-
ger to feminism and has predicted that the success of the pro-life movement would lead to an
increase in other efforts to limit women's rights. &e Anti-Abortion Group Asks Defeat ofJavits and
Five Others at Polls, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1980, at All, col. 1.
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Dodd received 56.3 percent of the vote. 77 In our test of the Cathin in-
dex, 78 Connecticut's Third District was the highest in relative Catholic
population. If Catholic voters in 1980 chose candidates on the basis of
their abortion positions, one would expect Buckley to have done well in
the district. However, in the eight (of 15) counties in the Third District
for which vote totals are available (comprising 67 percent of the total
district vote), Dodd received 57.9 percent of the vote, a better percent-
age than he received in the state as a whole. 79 At the same time, Repub-
lican pro-choice House candidate Lawrence DeNardis won the open
Third District seat with 52.3 percent of the vote.80 At first glance, Buck-
ley appears to have been hindered by his pro-life position. 81
Of course, this discussion of the 1980 Senate races is at best a cursory
glance. The "conclusions" one reaches about the abortion issue in 1980
vary with the race examined, the information available, the circum-
stances unique to each race, and the viewer's predisposition. No firm or
accurate assessment emerges.8 2 The validity of the model is not under-
mined by the results of the 1980 election, however.
B. The Base Vote.: Partisan Loyalty in US Politics
The only independent variable in our model that proved consistently
statistically significant was the base vote, or normal party vote, for the
races in our sample. Overall party identification has not changed signif-
icantly since 1973 although the success or failure of individual candi-
dates may have slightly altered the base votes of some states or House
districts since our 1976 sample.8 3
77. AMERICA VOTES, supra note 64, at 1. 14 AMERICA VOTED I (R. Scammon and A.
McGilli eds. 1981).
78. See Appendix A, infra p. 138.
79. AMERICA VOTES, supra note 64, at 3.
80. Id. at 2.
81. In analyzing the Connecticut situation, we note that Buckley faced a "carpetbagger"
image problem concerning his former status as a New York Senator while Dodd benefitted
from his family's long-time political prominence in Connecticut.
82. One can characterize the 1980 federal elections as a victory for conservatives and,
hence, a victory for the pro-life movement, as conservative congressmen are more likely than
liberal congressmen to hold pro-life views. This correlation is also reflected in the electorate,
making it difficult if not impossible to determine whether the pro-life movement begets a
conservative trend or merely benefits from it. See Granberg, Pro-life or Reftction of Conservative
Ideology? An analysis of Opposition to Legalized Abortion, 62 SOC. AND Soc. RES. 414 (1978). It
would be inappropriate to conclude that the conservative victories in 1980 resulted from the
pro-life views of conservative candidates, or from their stances on any particular social issue.
83. For example, the retirement of former House member Robert Giamo of Connecticut's
Third District in 1980 undoubtedly altered the political landscape. Giamo was a 24-year
veteran of the House and in his last three campaigns (1974, 1976, 1978), he received an aver-
age of 58.9 percent of the vote. In 1980, Republican Lawrence DeNardis and Democrat Joe
Lieberman vied for the open seat; DeNardis won with 52.3 percent of the total vote.
AMERICA VOTES, supra note 64, at 90. Thus, the base or "normal" vote for Connecticut's
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In 1973, 42 percent of adult Americans considered themselves Demo-
crats, while 27 percent called themselves Republicans and 31 percent
were Independents.8 4 In 1980, the figures were 43 percent, 29 percent,
and 28 percent, respectively. 5 Thus, it seems the nation's "normal"
partisanship has not changed during this period.8 6 Therefore, one major
component of the model-the base vote-is as valid a measure today as
it was in 1976.87
Third District in 1976 was 38.7 percent Republican. In 1982, it is 45.8 percent Republican.
Absent any evidence to the contrary, however, we may assume that such changes (e.g. retire-
ment of popular incumbents) occur randomly and balance one another over time. See, e.g.,
Michigan's 10th District in 1978; 13-term Republican Elford A. Cederberg was defeated by
Democrat Donald J. Albosta lowering the GOP base vote in the District from 59.2 percent to
47.9 percent.
84. 1 G. GALLUP, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1972-1977 112 (1978). Public re-
sponse to questions regarding political affiliation, like those on any topic, are subject to short-
lived fluctuations that stop short of establishing a long-term trend. For example, the Republi-
can party experienced what appeared to be a defection to Independent identification as the
Watergate crisis deepened. See Id. at 233 (24 percent Republican; 42 percent Democratic; 34
percent independent in response to same question as asked in the early 1973 survey). When
the standard Gallup party identification question was asked again in early Fall, 1976, when
Jimmy Carter was running strong against President Ford, Democratic party identification
responses increased. See Id. at 895 (23 percent Republican; 48 percent Democratic; and 29
percent Independent in response to question). In the wake of Ronald Reagan's sizable elec-
tion victory and during his "honeymoon" immediately after the inauguration, many more
independent responses were received at the expense of Democrats, as the gap between the
parties narrowed to 11 percentage points, the smallest Democratic edge in 25 years. See Public
Prefers a Balanced Budget to Large Cut in Taxes, Poll Shows. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1981, at A1, col.
3 (37 percent Democratic, 26 percent Republican, 37 percent Independent in response to
question). Subsequent political events have seen President Reagan's popularity fall, as has
public identification with the Republican party. Voter partisan identification appears to
have returned to "normal" levels. See Sussman, Shift by Voters to GOP Ending, Poll Finds, Wash.
Post, Dec. 16, 1981, at A2, col. 1 (Washington Post/ABC News Poll shows 39 percent Demo-
cratic, 23 percent Republican, 38 percent Independent party identification).
85. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE
TO CONGRESS 514 (2d ed. 1976). Since 1967, roughly 25 percent of Gallup Poll respondents
have professed Republicanism while roughtly 43 percent have identified with the Democratic
Party. Id. at 514. The Democratic high-water mark was 53 percent in 1964 while the Repub-
licans reached a high of 37 percent in 1953, shortly after Dwight Eisenhower's election. Id.
Though comparison of any two isolated polls could be used to indicate a "trend" toward
either party, examination of the polls over time suggests partisan stability in the U.S. during
the past 15 years.
86. Though one could argue that 1978 and 1980 indicate a Republican trend, observers
have not generally viewed these elections as "critical" elections signalling a major partisan
realignment. See M. BARONE AND G. UJITUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1982
xxvii-xxxii (1981). According to Professor Burnham, a critical election is one resulting in a
basic change in the composition of the coalition supporting one or both of the major parties.
See generally W. BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRING OF POLITICS (1966).
Other analysts prefer to talk of "maintaining" elections (those that do not involve a funda-
mental shift in the electorate's partisan behavior, whatever the result of the election and
"realigning" elections (those associated with a fundamental shift in partisan strength). See K.
PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969).
87. However, a long-lasting shift to the GOP, if it occured in 1978-80, would probably aid
the pro-life movement, as a much higher proportion of Republican candidates hold pro-life
views. See supra pp. 16-18.
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C. The Education Index.- Increase in US. Education Levels
Another independent variable in our model was the education index
(Educin), a measure of the proportion of those over 25 in a state or dis-
trict who had attended four years or more of college. To derive this
index, we referred to the CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT DATABOOKS' data,
which was derived from the 1970 Census. Between 1970 and 1979, the
percentage of Americans 25 years old and over who had completed four
years of college or more rose from 11.0 percent to 16.4 percent, an in-
crease of 5.4 percent. 88 Thus, the regression model in 1982 would have a
larger education index unless the selected sample contests uniformly ran
counter to the national trend of increased college education, an unlikely
result. Available evidence suggests that an electorate with more college
background accrues to the benefit of pro-choice candidates,8 9 however,
the Educin variable was not statistically significant in either our total
sample model or any of the subsample models.90
D. The Catholic Index.- A Continuing Decline in Devoutness
The third independent variable in our model was the index of the
relative percentage of Roman Catholic voters derived from the percent-
age of foreign stock Americans in a given state or district. 9' The b-slope
associated with this variable favored Democrats, while the Educin b-
slope favored Republicans. Unlike the Educin b-slope, however, the
Cathin b-slope was statistically significant in two regression equations:
the model for the total sample; and the model for the subsample of con-
tests involving incumbents.
9 2
During the past 20 years, observers have widely perceived a decline in
church support, including the Catholic Church.93 Survey data supports
this view. In the past decade, Catholic church attendance has declined
88. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1980) (Series P-20 No. 356) (hereinafter cited as EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT). College attendance increased more among white (5.6 percent) than blacks
(3.4 percent) and the proportion of college males of both races grew faster than the percent-
age of college females. (6.4 percent increase for white males; 4.7 percent for white females; 3.7
percent for black males; 3.1 percent for black females). Id. at 1. Among younger persons, the
overall increase was 6.7 percent. Id. The increase in college attendance was greater in metro-
politan areas (6.3 percent) than in nonmetropolitan (4.8 percent). Id. at 3.
89. See supra p. 10 (higher education correlated with pro-choice opinions).
90. See supra p. 12.
91. See ingfa Appendix A.
92. See supra p. 12.
93. See, e.g., A. GREELEY, CRISIS IN THE CHURCH 9-10 (1979) ("For Roman Catholicism
in the United States, the problem [of a declining church] is especially acute. There have been
massive resignations from the priesthood and the religious life, vocations have declined drasti-
cally, and the credibility of the church as a teacher of sexual ethics seems to be eroding
rapidly.").
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markedly 94 as has expressed adherence to church doctrine. 95 Church
attendance is highly correlated with pro-life opinions96 and political ac-
tivism among Catholics.9 7 This decline in Catholic Church attendance
and support might appear to undermine pro-life political efforts.
Catholics are still better church-goers than Protestants, however, 98
though the differential has narrowed over the past 25 years. 99 Rank and
file Catholics also evidence greater support for the Church stand on
abortion than they do its views regarding artificial contraception.10 0
This probably minimizes any decline in the Church's leadership as a
pro-life force despite the overall decline in church support and attend-
ance. This component of the regression model should therefore remain
valid.
E. Incumbency." The "Ins" are still more equal than the "Outs"
As previously noted, incumbency is an important and valuable status
for political candidates.' 0 The overwhelming majority of incumbents
seeking re-election, particularly House incumbents are returned to of-
fice.' 02 Between 1956 and 1976, the success ratio of incumbents in-
creased, prompting many political scientists to refer to "vanishing"
marginal or competitive districts. 0 3 Scholars have posited many differ-
ent explanations for the increasing advantage of incumbency, including:
(1) redistricting in which the map-drawing of incumbent legislatures
94. See M. HANNA, supra note 24, at 105-07 (1980).
95. Id. at 128-34.
96. Id. at 117-35 (Catholics who attend church less often are less likely to hold political
opinions consistent with church doctrine regarding social issues and are also more likely to be
tolerant of non-conformity in others).
97. Id. at 119.
98. Id. at 107 (in 1970, 64.6 percent of Catholics reported attending church at least once
per month; for Protestants, the figure was 49.1 percent).
99. Id. (1950, 81.3 percent of Catholics attended church at least once per month as com-
pared to 54.4 percent of Protestants); See also Lazerwitz, A Comparson of Major United States
Religions, 56 J. OF THE Am. STATISTICAL ASSN. 568 (1961), reprinted in THE SOCIAL MEANING
OF RELIGION 130 (W. Newman ed. 1974) (in 1957, 72 percent of Catholics said they attended
Church regularly; for Protestants, the figure was 39 percent).
100. M. HANNA, supra note 24, at 170, 174.
101. See supra pp. 11-13.
102. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, 1974 -ANNUAL ALMANAC 840 (1975)
("In virtually every election in recent years, more than 90 percent of all incumbents sought
re-election, and more than 95 percent of those who ran won."); See also Cover, One Good Term
Deserves Another- The Advantages of Incumbency in Congressional Elections, 21 AM. J. POL. SC. 523
(1977); Erikson, The Advantage in Incumbency in Congressional Elections, 3 POLITY 395 (1971).
103. See, e.g., Born, Generational Replacement and the Growth of Incumbent Re-election Margins in
the US House, 73 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 811 (1979); Fiorina, The Case of the Vanishing Marginals:
The Bureaucracy Did It, 71 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 177 (1977); Mayhew, Congressional Elections; The
Case of the Vanishing Marginals, 6 POLITY 295 (1974).
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protects incumbent legislators; 0 4 greater visibility of incumbents to the
voter;' 0 5 a decline in party identification that enhances the importance
of incumbent visibility and existing organizational infrastructure; 0 6 the
high cost of campaigns coupled with the tendency of "smart" contribu-
tors to back the favored incumbent in order to gain future legislative
favor; 0 7 and the increasingly ombudsman-like role played by congres-
sional offices, prompting voters to view incumbents as helpful trouble-
shooters rather than representatives of certain parties, ideologies, or
interest groups. 08 Whatever the reason, the political science commu-
nity appears to agree that an equally resourceful incumbent of today is
in a stronger re-election position than two decades ago. To the extent
that incumbency's value increased since 1976, our model would, cetens
paribus, overstate the psychological importance of the abortion issue.
In recent years, the proportion of congressional incumbents seeking
re-election has remained relatively stable. 0 9 In the House, incumbent
retention has been stable since 1976.' 10 Even in 1980, the year of highly
publicized defeats of long-term senators such as Bayh and McGovern,
91 percent of the House was re-elected."'I The last three Senate elec-
tions were laced with incumbent demise, however. The retention of
Senators was 63 percent in 1976, 67 percent in 1978, and 63 percent in
1980, compared to a pre-1976 norm of over 90 percent. Thus, it seems
that our model of the 1976 federal elections took a snapshot of a typical
House election year and the beginning of what may be an era in which
Senate incumbents are more vulnerable than previously." 2 It therefore
104. See Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems, 67 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 550 (1973).
105. Mayhew, supra note 103, at 311.
106. Burnham, Communications, 68 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 210 (1974).
107. Jacobson, Practical Consequences of Campaign Finance Reform: An Incumbent Protection Act?
24 PUB. POL. 1 (1976).
108. See Fiorina, supra note 103, at 179-81; Born, supra note 103, at 811, 813-14.
109. In 1976, 25 Senators and 381 Representatives sought re-election. In 1978, 22 Sena-
tors and 377 Representatives ran. In 1980, 25 Senators and 392 Representatives sought re-
election.
110. In 1976, only thirteen of 381 Representatives seeking re-election (3.4 percent) were
defeated. In 1978, only 19 of 377 incumbent House members (5 percent) lost. In 1980, 31 of
392 House incumbents (7.9 percent) met defeat, a lower figure than in 1974. Furthermore,
1980's slightly higher incumbent casualty figures may have resulted in part from the AB-
SCAM prosecutions of several prominent House members who were later turned out of office.
Also, nine of the defeated incumbents were Democratic "Watergate babies" first elected in
1974. In the 1976 and 1978 elections combined, nine Watergate baby Democrats went down
to defeat. Some or all of the these 1980 incumbent losses may have resulted from a six-year
return to normalcy in their districts. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, 1980 CON-
GRESSIONAL QTRLY.
111. Id. ALMANAC B10-5 (1981).
112. Despite the well-publicized conservative gains in the Senate in 1980, the 1980 elec-
tions were no worse statistically for Senate incumbents than were those of 1978 or 1976.
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appears that, concerning the impact of incumbency, the 1976 model re-
mains valid in 1982.
One might also ask whether Senators and Representatives have taken
more polarized abortion stances since 1976. It appears they have not.
As heretofore noted, the 1976 Guttmacher Institute rating used in this
study resulted in 78 Senators with clearly defined abortion positions (48
pro-choice and 30 pro-life)."13 According to the 1982 Guttmacher-
Planned Parenthood data,' 1 4 66 Senators (40 pro-life and 26 pro-choice)
held consistent abortion positions during 1979-81;115 157 Representa-
tives had clearly defined abortion positions (43 pro-choice and 114 pro-
life)." t6 In 1979-81, 251 Representatives held consistent positions (127
pro-life and 124 pro-choice). The Congressional voting evaluations of
the National Right to Life Committee reflect similar legislator consis-
tency on the issue." t7 Though the profile of Congressional incumbents
on the abortion issue has increased somewhat in recent years, the in-
crease is not vast. On balance, we conclude that neither the vulnerabil-
ity, availability, nor the visibility of incumbent congressmen has so
changed since 1976 as to undermine the validity of the model.
F. Public Opinion on Abortion
If public opinion on the abortion issue has changed since 1976, the
model's results might be altered. Public opinion regarding abortion has
remained nearly constant since 1973, however. Most polls have found
the public to hold qualified abortion attitudes. Generally, those sup-
porting some form of legal abortion are divided into two camps: those
who are willing to allow abortion for "soft" reasons such as the pregnant
woman's being unwed or poor, or the child being unwanted, form a
small majority. Those who endorse abortion only when necessitated by
113. See text and notes accompanying notes 19-20, supra.
114. The Planned Parenthood Federation of America, affiliated with the Guttmacher In-
stitute, has compiled the abortion issue voting records of Congress on 13 House votes and 12
Senate votes taken between 1979 and 1981. PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF
AMERICA, INC., CONGRESS AND THE ABORTION ISSUE 1979-1981 (1982).
115. Id. It is of interest to note that the ratio of pro-life to pro-choice "committed" mem-
bers has shifted to the pro-life advantage in the Senate and toward a narrowing of the pro-life
edge in the House. In constructing this count, we considered all members who voted uni-
formly pro-life or pro-choice, even those new members who had voted only a few times. This
may have caused both the increase in the number of "committed" House members and the
pro-life shift in the Senate, as several 1980 contest resulted in the replacement of pro-choice
Senators with pro-life Senators. See supra pp. 21-24.
116. See supra p. 6. See Abortion Voting Records-US Senate: 1973-80. National Right to
Life News, Sept. 15, 1980 at A, col. 1; at 1, col 1. (approximately three-fourths of the Senate
and two-thirds of the House held consistent abortion views).
117. ALAN GUTITMACHER INSTITUTE, RECORDS ON ABORTION OF U.S. HOUSE AND SEN-
ATE (1976).
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so-called "hard" reasons such as danger to the pregnant woman's life or
health or a substantial chance that the fetus, if carried to term, would be
deformed, add substantially to this majority. Those who oppose abor-
tion for any reason are a distinct though large minority. 1 8
Abortion attitudes in the U.S. have steadily become more liberal.
One study of surveys conducted between 1965 and 1970 concluded that
a "substantial shift toward more permissive attitudes on abortion oc-
curred in the five-year period."'"l 9 Public approval of abortion for both
hard and soft reasons continued to increase during the early 1970s and
increased after the 1973 Supreme Court decision. This was true among
both Catholics and Protestants, as Table 5 shows.
TABLE 5120
Abortion approval by reason: Protestant Catholic
Reason for Abortion 1972 1973 1972 1973
Danger to mother's health 83 91 80 88
Rape 74 81 70 75
Chance of defective child 75 83 67 77
Child unwanted 36 46 29 34
Mother unwed 39 48 32 34
Too poor to have child 45 52 36 39
The DeVries Poll, commissioned by the National Committee for a
Human Life Amendment and taken in December 1974, elicited reac-
tions to a statement that brought abortion absolutism into sharper focus:
"Abortion should not be allowed under any circumstances". Table 6
lists the results of that survey.
118. See generally Uslaner and Weber, Public Support for Pro-Choice Abortion Polices in the Na-
tion and States: Changes and Stabilhty After the Roe and Doe Decriions," 77 MICH. L. REv 1772
(1979), reprinted in SCHNEIDER and VINOVSKIS supra note 16, at 206. Applying an extensive
collection of pre- and post-Roe survey data, the authors conclude that broad public consensus
regarding abortion was and is lacking and that Roe did not significantly increase public sup-
port for legalized abortion subject only to the constraints set forth in that decision.
119. 1 COMM'N ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE, DEMOGRAPHIC
AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF POPULATION GROWTH, 577 (1972).
120. NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE (NARAL), PUBLIC OPINION POLLS
SINCE THE SUPREME COURT DECISION OF 1973 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NARAL, Public
Opinion Polls]. But see Uslaner and Weber, supra note 118, at 1779, SCHNEIDER and
VINOVSKIS, supra note 16, at 214 ("We have not seen substantial increases in public support
for abortion after the Court decisions; instead, we have witnessed a hardening of positions by
many who were opposed to abortions"). Nevertheless, Uslaner and Weber feel that the
abortion controversy has become "increasingly salient," if not resolved.
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TABLE 6121
Total Catholic Protestant Jewish
Strongly agree 15.8% 22.3% 14.6% 2.6%
Mildly agree 7.8 9.0 7.9 3.6
Mildly disagree 21.7 22.7 23.2 4.5
Strongly disagree 50.5 42.0 49.5 86.9
Not sure 4.2 4.0 4.8 2.4
Despite some angry reaction to the Roe decision and stepped-up pro-
life efforts to affect public opinion, pro-choice sentiment continued, by
most indications, to grow slightly in 1973 but level off thereafter. 22
More recent polls show no substantial change in public attitudes to-
ward abortion. Response in given surveys will vary according to the
phrasing of the questions, but 1979, 1980, and 1981 surveys show that,
overall, between two-thirds and three-fourths of Americans feel a wo-
man and her doctor should be permitted to make the abortion decision;
between 50 and 70 percent of the public opposes legislation designed to
overrule Roe v. Wade.1
23
An August, 1980 New York Times/CBS PoIl124 reveals both the sta-
bility and volatility of public opinion on the abortion issue. When re-
spondents were asked: "Do you think there should be an amendment to
the Constitution prohibiting abortions or shouldn't there be such an
amendment?", 62 percent took a pro-choice position in opposition to a
pro-life amendment (29 percent favored such an amendment and 9 per-
cent weren't sure).' 25 When asked "Do you believe there should be an
amendment to the Constitution protecting the life of the unborn child,
or shouldn't there be such an amendment?", 50 percent took a pro-life
stance favoring such an amendment while 39 percent opposed it and 11
percent were undecided. 26 When asked "If a woman wants to have an
abortion and her doctor agrees to it, should she be allowed to have an
abortion or not?", 62 percent of the respondents again took a pro-choice
position while 15 percent said the woman's freedom to obtain an abor-
tion depended on the circumstances; 19 percent adopted a pro-life posi-
121. NARAL, Publi Opinion Polls, supra note 120.
122. See de Boer, supra note 6; Uslaner and Weber, supra note 118, at 1776, 211.
123. See Adamek, Abortion and Public Opinion in the United States, National Right to Life
News, April 22, 1982, at P8-9. See also NARAL, Should Abortion Be Legal?, supra note 6, at 1
(August, 1979 poll conducted for NARAL Political Action Committee shows that one-fifth
(19 percent) of respondents think abortion should be "legal in all circumstances" while an
additional two-thirds (64 percent) think abortion should be "permitted in some situations."
124. Abortion Poll- Not Clear-Cut, N.Y. Times, August 18, 1980 at AI5, col. 1.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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tion against any abortions. 127 This observed respondent inconsistency
has existed throughout the 1970s.
128
All told, an examination of the polls on abortion suggests that the
model has not been dated by any subsequent shifts in public opinion
that could translate into changes in general election voting regarding
abortion.
G. Changes in the Poh't'cal Scene
Of course, a regression model of the results of political candidates may
no longer be accurate if the nature of politics has changed. Thus, we
briefly examine the general shape of political events surrounding the
abortion issue since 1976.
During the past several years, several new pro-life legislative efforts
have been added to those involved in classifying the candidates in our
1976 model. These include the Hyde Amendment prohibiting the use of
federal funds for abortion, which passed Congress in 1976. Spousal and
parental consent and notification restrictions have also been pursued by
various states. The major newcomer is the "Human Life Federalism
Amendment" (S.J. Res. 110) authored by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-
Utah), which was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in
Fall, 1981.129 We suggest, however, that the average voter, to the extent
he finds the abortion issue salient, cares only about the "bottom line,"
i.e., what a given candidate thinks regarding the legality of abortion.
The appearance of these new pro-life options has not appeared to
fragment pro-life electioneering efforts. The larger pro-life community
appears to support both the Hatch Amendment and the Helms Bill as
well as the more venerable Buckley-like amendment and states' rights
amendment. 130 The emergence of new pro-life legislative initiatives has
127. Id.; respondents to the Times poll with more years of education were less likely to
shift positions according to different phrasings of the question.
128. See Blake, Elective Abortion and Our Reluctant Citizenry; Research on Public Opinion in the
United States, in THE ABORTION EXPERIENCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL IMPACT 20
(1973) (wide differences in poll response according to phrasing of the abortion question);
Adamek, supra note 123, at 10.
129. See Federalism Amendment, supra note 7, at 9-20.
130. See Andrusko, Reagan's Plea Uniies Protestant Leaders, National Right to Life News,
April 22, 1982, at 1, col. I (representatives of National Association of Evangelicals, the South-
ern Baptist Convention, Moral Majority, Pro-life Ministers, Lutherans for Life endorse both
measures; National Right to Life Committee president Jack Willke states that the religious
group "endorsements should put to rest once and for all any doubts pro-lifers may have that
either the HLB [Helms Human Life Bill] or the 'Hatch' [Hatch Human Life Federalism
Amendment] represent in any way a compromise of principle. Until we can muster the sup-
port for legislation such as [a total abortion ban or a Buckley-like amendment] it is vital that
we do not allow our present favorable situation to slip by without passing a 'first step,'
whether that be the bill or the Hatch . . . or both."). See also Anti-Abortion Group Backs Hatch
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not seemed to weaken the political force of the pro-life movement.
Rather, these newly proposed measures seem to have enhanced the pro-
life political efforts. 13 ' The Buckley-like amendments never were re-
ported out of subcommittee or committee; the Hatch amendment was.
The direct evidence of organized pro-choice and pro-life interest
group activity since 1976 suggests that both groups have been organized
and active. 132 The published accounts suggest somewhat greater pro-
life electioneering activity. 33 However, any current pro-life activity ad-
vantage appears to have also existed before 1976;134 no information sug-
gests the widening of the activity gap between 1976 and the present.
However, since 1976, "New Right" political groups such as the Na-
tional Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), Moral Ma-
jority, and the National Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress
(NCSFC) have grown in activity and funding, thereby coming to play a
larger role in campaigns. 35 To the extent that these groups' activities
help elect pro-life politicians, they will aid the pro-life movement.
Though the New Right groups espouse fiscal conservatism, their conser-
vatism is perhaps best known regarding social issues where they have
sought to defeat legislators with "liberal" positions on social issues-
principally abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, and gay rights.
36
New Right activists view their conservative alliance with fundamen-
talist religions as a symbiotic association and an important develop-
ment.' 37  According to a 1980 New York Times/CBS Poll, "the
evangelicals 38-particularly those who are Protestant-were substan-
Proposal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1981, at A31, col. 1 (National Right to Life Committee dele-
gates vote to support the Hatch Amendment).
13 1. Roberts, Foes of Abortion Meet With Reagan, N.Y. Times, at Jan. 23, 1982, at A1, col. I
("For all its problems, the antiabortion movement seems stronger today than at any time
since . . . 1973."; estimated 25,000 pro-lifers participated in Jan. 23, 1982 March for Life).
132. See, e.g., Abortion Foes Gird For Iowa Caucuses, supra note 69, at 22, col. 4; Knight, Drive
for Abortion Rights Begins, supra note 8, at A12, col. 1.
133. See Abortion tinder Attack, supra note 2. Herbers, supra note 8, at A l, col. 1.
134. Between 1973 and 1976, the pro-life movement: established a large, annual "March
for Life" in Washington, D.C. to commemorate the Roe v. Wade decision; established a Pas-
toral Plan for Pro-Life Activities; organized the National Right to Life Committee, the Amer-
ican Citizens Concerned for Life, and various state chapters of these organizations and raised
hundreds of thousands of dollars for the cause. During the same time period, the pro-choice
movement engaged in comparatively little election activity, concentrating instead on court
challenges to restrictive abortion laws and lobbying Congress.
135. See Kondracke, supra note 70; Rosenbaum, Conservatives Embrace Reagan on Social Issues,
N.Y. Times, April 21, 1980 at B12, col. 1; Weinraub, supra note 8, at B6, col. 1; Evangelical
Conservatives Move from Pews to Polls, But Can They Sway Congress?, 1980 CONG. QTRLY WEEKLY
RrT. 2627 [hereinafter cited as Evangehials].
136. Evangelicals, supra note 135, at 2627-30; Rosenbaum, supra note 135, at B12, col. 1.
137. Evangelicals, supra note 135, at 2629 (Weyrich and Phillips see evangelical involve-
ment in politics as significant aide to the conservative cause).
138. Evangelicals were those who stated, in response to a survey question, that they had
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tially more conservative" than other survey respondents.' 39 According
to Richard Wirthlin, President Reagan's pollster, "born-again"
Catholics are more conservative than "born-again" Protestants, who are
more conservative than practising but not evangelical Catholics.
40
However, the degree of difference in conservatism between evangelicals
and the electorate at large is rather small.' 4 1 They were, however, much
more likely to oppose legalized abortion and the Equal Rights Amend-
ment "although even on these issues, substantial evangelical minorities
dissented from the conservative view."'
142
Increased religious political activity will likely aid the pro-life move-
ment, but perhaps no more than it aids conservatism as a whole. Terry
Dolan, NCPAC activity director, succinctly stated, "[b]eing an evangeli-
cal naturally leads to a person being a conservative."' 143  However,
Charles Cade, director of state organizing for Moral Majority, has em-
phasized the role of economic issues in the political activism of the
evangelicals. Said Cade:
Abortion, pornography, homosexuality, those are hard for average
Christians to relate to. They don't read Playboy, their daughters aren't
pregnant, they don't know any queers. But when people's life savings are
deteriorating at 15 to 20 percent a year, that is evil.
144
At this juncture, we can not accurately assess the impact of the emerging
evangelical right on the politics of abortion.
Increased New Right organizing and campaign spending 45 appeared
to have contributed to the 1980 defeats of Bayh, Church, McGovern,
and Culver. However, some have argued that New Right efforts may
have engendered a backlash against conservative candidates due to the
made a personal committment to Jesus Christ. See Evangelicals' Vote is Major Target, N.Y.






143. God and Politics: Mixing More Than Ever, 1978 CONG. QrRLY WEEKLY RPT. 2565,
2566. Dolan's comment could be amended to read "being religious" or "attending religious
services regularly" and would then be supported by a wealth of survey data indicating that
church attendance correlates with conservative ideology. See, e.g., M. HANNA, supra note 24,
at 115-30; A. GREELEY, supra note 93, at 80.
144. Evangehicals, supra note 135, at 2630.
145. In 1980, NCPAC spent more than one million dollars on political campaigns, $128,
169 in direct contributions to congressional candidates, (see Contributions of SelectedPolical Ac-
tion Committees, 1980 CONG. QTRLY WEEKLY RPT. 3406), and two to three million dollars
more on politically related activities. In 1978, NCPAC spent more in direct campaign contri-
butions, $184,541, (see Contributions to Selected Political. Action Committees, 1978 CONG. QTRLY
WEEKLY RPT. 3261), but far less in "independent" expenditures in opposition to foes or on
behalf of favored candidates. See Weinraub, supra note 8, at B6, col. 1.
Vol. 1: 1, 1982
Examination of Abortion Issue
movement's strident rhetoric. 46 We view recent elections and New
Right activity as indicating, in 1978 and 1980, a conservative trend in
American politics. Logically, pro-life candidates will benefit from this
trend, should it continue, but only in part because of their views on
abortion. It seems unlikely that the abortion issue, in and of itself, has
fueled the conservative trend. Rather, abortion is but one of myriad
issues employed by better organized and financed conservative interest
groups. To the extent that pro-life candidates benefit from a trend to-
ward conservatism, their electoral security is somewhat perilous. As
noted earlier, the .conservative trend of recent years may have been
largely economically based. Should the national economy continue to
perform poorly in 1982 and 1984, we may witness a return to more "lib-
eral" voting patterns favoring Democrats and pro-choice candidates.
We therefore note conservative gains through 1980 but suggest that the
impact of the abortion issue in general elections remains unchanged
since 1976.
IV. Conclusion
An examination of empirical data, modeled through regression analy-
sis, indicates that the abortion issue had not altered the net voting for
major party candidates in congressional general elections. In our model,
only the normal party vote was consistently correlated with candidate
performance in a statistically significant way. We further found no sta-
tistically significant indication of abortion-based voting shifts by the
general electorate, Catholic voters, or the highly educated. This sug-
gests that the abortion issue, in and of itself, will not affect partisan vot-
ing patterns.
Our data confirm the long-established political dictum that American
Catholics, the voting bloc whose political behavior was most expected to
respond to the abortion issue, strongly support the Democratic Party, so
much so that their voting pattern exhibits little change in response to
the abortion issue. The college-educated bloc tends to possess voting
habits less consistent than those of Catholics. The college-educated vari-
able's impact on elections is also statistically insignificant in the face of
any abortion position assumed by the candidates of either party. If this
146. See Gallup Poll Shows More Than HIa/f Americans Know of Moral Majority, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 24, 1982, at A24, col. 4 (55 percent of Americans know of Moral Majority; more than
two-thirds of these respondents have unfavorable opinion of the organization); See also Engle-
hardt, Indiana, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 1980, at 18-19 (Republican Representative Dan
Quayle, who successfully challenged Democratic Senator Birch Bayh in Indiana in 1980
sought to avoid being labeled as the candidate of New Right groups such as NCPAC and
Moral Majority due to possible backlash).
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group comprises the nucleus of the pro-choice movement, its numbers
and solidarity suggest little direct impact on voting. We reiterate: the
normal party base vote of a district and the presence of an incumbent
legislator produced greatest impact on the 1976 vote.
Certainly, the partisan allegiances activated in a general election re-
duce the potential impact of the abortion issue. In many contests, the
concerned voter was denied the possibility of choice on the abortion is-
sue. As we have seen, clear-cut distinctions between major party candi-
dates did not exist in about half of the districts; much of the time, voters
viewed a "tweedledeedum" and "tweedledeedee" contest. The homoge-
nous nature of congressional districts and the nomination system in
American politics, rather than candidates fear of pro-choice and pro-life
interest groups, probably creates this congruence.
Primary election experience in some states suggest that the abortion
issue can take on greater importance in primary contests. Though an
exhaustive study of congressional primaries would be more difficult and
time-consuming than our general election examination, it could well
yield different results. Volunteer recruitment and interest group activity
present other facets of electioneering in which the abortion issue may
increase in salience. Should one set of abortion activists show a greater
willingness to work for its preferred candidate, the marginal electoral
impact of the issue could increase. Only an extensive case study of sev-
eral congressional races can assess this.
Regarding general elections, we must conclude that the vast majority
of congressional races simply will not be electorally affected by the abor-
tion issue, except according to random chance. This suggests that politi-
cians would do well to base their abortion positions upon sound
evidence and reflection rather than the illusory possibility of electoral
gain.
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Appendix A: Testing the Catholic Index
To test the hypothesis underlying this study's Catholic Index, eleven
congressional districts 147 which lend themselves to a Catholicism test
were randomly selected from this paper's sample. These districts were
testable because of the continuity of their county and congressional dis-
trict boundaries. 48 This continuity enabled the Catholic index of each
district that was derived from the foreign stock totals to be compared to
the religious affiliation of each county, as reported in the book Churches
and Church Membership in the United States by the Glenmary Institute of
Washington, D.C.
The Catholic membership for each county listed in the Glenmary
book, was added together to arrive at a total for each district. This was
divided by the total population for that district. This Glenmary Catho-
lic index was then correlated with the foreign stock Catholic index.'
49
This paper's foreign stock shortcut for calculating Catholicism explains
more than 90 percent of the variance in Catholic population between
congressional districts. It is important to remember that this Catholic
index is only an indication of the relative degree of Catholic population,
it does not indicate the actual number or percentage of Catholics in
each congressional district. For example, the Catholic index of 70.7 in
Connecticut's 3rd House District does not mean that 70 percent of the
district's residents are Catholics. Rather, it means that there is a propor-
tionally greater Catholic population in that district than in Florida's 1st
District, where the index is only 5.4. The index reveals the relative
strength of the Catholic vote in the districts this paper is studying. This
knowledge enables us to analyze the 1976 election results to determine if
the results differ between districts with large or small "Catholic votes,"
and allows us to determine if the more heavily Catholic districts do in
fact evidence greater support of pro-life candidates.
As the Scattergram in Table 7 indicates, the relationship between the
147. California 18; Connecticut 3; Florida 1; Illinois 17; Illinois 21; Iowa 1; Maryland 1;
New York 39; Ohio 10; Pennsylvania 8; Pennsylvania 24.
148. Most of the eleven districts in this mini-sample did not dissect counties at all. The
others cut into a county only a small amount or contained roughly 90% of a county that was
shared with another congressional district. Where a district, such as California's 18th, con-
tained only a small portion of one county, that county's religious affiliation figures from the
Glenmary book were not included in the comparison. When a district, such as Illinois' 21st,
contained the vast bulk (but not quite all) of a county, the entire county religious affiliation
from the Glenmary book was included in the comparison of the Glenmary index and the
Foreign Stock index.
149. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, THE CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT DATA
BOOK (1973).
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Glenmary figures and this study's foreign stock index is consistent, with
one outlier. This suggests that the high Pearson's R between the foreign
stock Catholic index and Glenmary figures did not result from an aver-
aging of disparate relations.
TABLE 7
SCATTERGRAM-GLENMARY AND









45--- - -- _
40-- -
35 - - -
30-- - - - - - - - - _
2s - - - - - - - - __
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Glenmary Figure
for Catholic Church Membership
A comparison of key demographic statistics of the sample of 11 House

























Vol. 1: 1, 1982
Examination of Abortion Issue
to test the foreign stock index are not "oddballs". 51 For example, the
average age of the population in the sample is 27.3 compared with 28.1
x y x2  y2  xy
Cal 18 3.3 12.6 10.9 158.8 41.6
Conn 3 18.3 70.7 334.9 4,998.5 1,293.8
Fla 1 1.5 5.4 2.3 29.2 8.1
Ill 17 7.3 27.8 53.3 772.8 202.9
I1 21 3.2 12.8 10.2 163.8 41.0
Iowa 1 1.6 17.6 2.6 309.8 28.2
MD 1 1.6 13.6 2.6 185.0 21.8
NY 39 7.5 23.1 56.3 533.6 173.3
Ohio 10 1.2 5.7 1.4 32.5 6.8
PA 8 10.1 27.0 102.0 729.0 291.9
PA 24 8.9 28.9 79.2 835.2 240.3
Totals 64.5 245.2 655.7 8,748.2 2,349.7
The formula for determining the correlation coefficient Pearson's R is:
N (xy) - (x) (y)
/[N (y.X2) - (.x)2] [N (yy2) - (yy)2]
the following calculation was performed.
11 (2349.7) - (64.5) (245.2)
./[11 (655.7) - (4,160.3)] [11 (8,748.2) - (60,123.0)]
25,846.6 - 15,815.4
N/(3,052.4) (36,107.2)
10,031.3 - .96 =R
10,497.6
R 2 = .91
As the preceding table and calculations show, the Glenmary Catholic figures and the Foreign
Stock Catholic index correlate closely with an R of .96 and an R2 of .91.
151. Because the Catholic index could not be tested where congressional districts signifi-
cantly bisected counties, such districts were not able to be part of the sample group. They
were discarded and another district was chosen by using a table of random numbers until the
sample was large enough to facilitate calculating a correlation coefficient. Understandably,
the sample is therefore somewhat less urban and metropolitan than the nation in aggregate.
This, however, is the only area in which the sample demographic figures significantly differ
from national census figures.
Comparison of the 11 Cathin Congressional Districts with the U.S. averages for key demo-
graphic characteristics.
Age Cathin Sample U.S. as whole
mean (of 11 districts) 27.3 28.1
Median family income $9,547 $9,586
'Percent of Urban Population
mean 60.5% 73.5%
Cathin U.S. as a whole




Mean (of district) $2,934 $3,119
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for the nation as a whole. The median family incomes are $9,547 and
$9,586, respectively. Median monthly rent for the sample is $106.40; for
the nation it is $108. In the sample of eleven, 49.5 percent of the
workforce is classified as blue collar compared to a national figure of
47.3 percent.
Median Home Value


















Blue Collar Percentage of
Work Force
Mean 49.6 47.3
Service Employee Percentage
of Work Force
Mean 7.5 8.1
Farm Employee Percentage
of Work Force
Mean 6.4 4.5
